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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
DONALD A. 'VILLIAMSON,
Plaintiff-A pp ell ant,
vs.

THE DENYER & RIO GHANDE
'VESTERN RAILROAD
COMPAXY, a corporation,

Case No.
12387

Defendant-Respondent.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
Appeal From Judgment of the Third Judicial District
Court in and fo1· Salt Lake County, State of Utah
Honouble James S. Sawaya, Judge

STA'l'El\IENT OF F'ACTS
As in Appellant's Brief, the parties herein will be
designated as they were in the trial court. The appellant, Donald A. "Tilliamson, will be ref erred to throughout as the plaintiff, and the respondent, The Denver &
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Rio Grande 'V estern Railroad Company, will be ref erred to throughout as the defendant.
Defendant agrees with certain portions of the Statement of Facts as presented by plaintiff, but takes issue
with other portions, and furthermore believes that plaintiff's Statement is incomplete. Plaintiff does not seek
this court's review of the jury's verdict for the defen<lant, no cause of action, on plaintiff's First Cause, to wit:
Plaintiff's accident of November 25, 1967. HoweYer,
since plaintiff has called the court's attention to certain
factual matters of record with respect to that first accident, defendant believes it necessary to point out certain
other facts of record with respect thereto.
At the time of the first accident, the plaintiff positioned himself at a place in the warehouse where he
was not supposed to be (Tr. 202). The switch foreman
on duty, George Larsen, testified that the normal position for the plaintiff would have been up on the loading
dock and not on the ground (Tr. 208). He further testified that if the plaintiff had been standing on the dock,
the first accident would not have occurred (Tr. 214215). The plaintiff admitted, on cross-examination regarding the first accident, that he had misjudged the
clearance between the loading dock and the train cars,
and that this misjudgment had contributed to or had
caused the accident complained of (Tr. 374).
'Vith respect to the Release executed by the parties on :March 22, 1968, in connection with that first
accident, the record shows that plaintiff had the same
2

throughout the various negotiations leading to
and the execution of that Helease (Tr. 39G). The plaintiff was paid lj;:J,400.00 in co1mection with his execution
ut that Helease, which was approximately twice the
amouut of his wage loss during the period he was out of
11ork (Tr. 401, Exhibit D-:37), and the plaintiff had to
pay 110 medical or hospital expenses in connection with
tlia t first accident (Tr. 401) .
.r\dclitional factual matters to which the defendant
"i::;hes to call the court's attention, but which relate to
the alleged second accident of which plaintiff complains,
han_. been incorporated in defendant's argument below.

OF POINTS HELIED UPON
I. There is ample support in the record for the jury

"rd id of no ca use of action
uf Action;
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plaintiff's Second Cause

Plaintiff's failure to objtct to the court's instructions precludes plaintiff from assigning as error the
court's failure to give a requested instruction;
:!.

a.

Plaintiff's failure to object to the submission of
the special interrogatory to the jury precludes plaintiff
from assigning that submission as error.

r

TIIEHE IS ..
SUPPORT IN THE
HECOHD FOll THE JURY YERDICT OF
3

NO CAUSE OF ACTION ON PLAINTIFF'S
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
It is asserted in plaintiff's Brief that the plaintiff's
own version of the incident of October 17, 1968 was uncontroverted at trial, and that the jury's verdict of no
cause of action "was contrary to every bit of sworn testimony" presented to the jury (pl. Br. pp. U-10). Such a
claim is not borne out by the record.
The record of trial in this matter dearly sustains
the jury verdict, and offers ample support for the jury's
decision on any one of the following grounds: ( 1) that
the claimed second accident did not occur; ( 2) that in
the event the accident did occur it resulted solely from
the negligence of the plaintiff; or ( 3) that the alleged
accident did not proximately cause the back injuries of
which plaintiff complained at trial.
On the first point, the record is clear that there was
no witness to the alleged accident of October 17, HHi8.
There was a switch crew of three persons, including the
plaintiff. Neither of the other crew members could eorroborate, of his own knowledge, the plaintiff's contention that such an accident in fact took place (Tr. 233235, 255 and 259).
With respect to the plaintiff's own negligenee,
Larry Hannigan, Switchforeman on this crew, testified
that it was not unusual for a bridle rod to be tmem·ered
and that it is important for a switchman to watch where
he is stepping when alighting to the ground from moYing equipment (Tr. 230-2:31). The reeord also shows
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tbt the S\\·;tchmen, including the plaintiff, knew that
the switch 1ight was located directly over the switch
plale, aud tliat stepping on that plate could be avoided
hy alighting to the ground on either side of the light and
plate (Tr. :W2-233 and 2:Ju-237).

The medical testimony in the case presented a
square conflict on the issue of causation, from which a
.Jlll'Y could reasonably find that the plaintiff did not sustain a hack or spine injury in the firsi: accident of No1
:25, IU67 and that those baek or spine problems
pre-existed the alleged second aecident on October 17,
1\)68.

Dr. Philip Howard, called by the plaintiff, testii icd positively that the plaintiff suffered no back or
injury in the first accident (Tr. 245, 250). In January, 1!)()8, plaintiff's counsel informed Dr. Howard
that they were considering a settlement of the claim and
a-,ked for a final evaluation. Dr. Howard reported that
the plaintiff suffered no permanent disability and released plaintiff for return to work on February 2, 1968
(Tr. 24;') and Exhibit P-14).
Dr. Paul Pemberton, an orthopedic surgeon called
hy plaintiff, corroborated the testimony of Dr. Howard
to the effect that plaintiff sustained no back or spine in.i ury in the first accident (Tr. 270-27 5). Dr. Pemberton
testified that the first accident was not the type of accident which causes a disc injury (Tr. 292 and Exhibit
D-:n). He described the plaintiff's present back problem as one invoking "degenerative disc material" (Tr.
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293.) He further testified that injury or accident is not
necessary to a ruptured disc and that frequently small
everyday motions can cause the rupture of an already
degenerating disc (Tr. 294). Finally, Dr. Pemberton
testified positively that the November, 1967 accident did
not cause the plaintiff's present disc condition (Tr. 294
and Exhibit D-31).
Dr. Charles Hall, another urthopedie surgeon, testified that he first saw the plaintiff on June 14, 1968,
some six months after the first accident and four months
before the alleged second accident and at that time eoncluded that the plaintiff had an irritation of the sciatic
nerve "presumably on the basis of a disc problem" (Tr.
333-335). Dr. Hall testified that he saw the plaintiff
again on October 21, 1968 and noted that he had
"stepped in a hole, aggrevating his back problems" (Tr.
336). He further testified that he next saw the plaintiff
on April 9, 1969 and that the plaintiff had "suddenly
gotten a lot worse." This was some six months after the
alleged second accident and Dr. Hall said he did not
note what had occasioned this sudden new problem (Tr.
336).
Dr. Hall's testimony provides in itself a sufficient
basis for the jury to find that the alleged accident of
October 17, 1968 was not the proximate cause of the
plaintiff's back problems. Dr. Hall was unable to testify
that there was in fact a causal relationship between the
alleged October, 1968 accident and the plaintiff's hack
problem which required an operation in April, 1969,
6

Dr. Hall's testimony also eorroborated in
material part the testimony of Dr.'s Howard and
Pemberton that the Xovember, 1967 accident did not
cause plaintiffs baek problems. On cross examination,
Dr. II all admitted that one normally expects symptoms
of disc injury to occur soon after an incident and not
and one-half months later, as the plaintiff claimed
in the instant ease (Tr. 341). Ile agreed that when sciatic paint is experieneed a long time after a claimed inci<lent, he would normally look for another and separate
cause of the baek problem (Tr. 342). In this respect, Dr.
Ilall stated that if there was no disc injury from the first
aceident, as Dr.'s' Howard and Pemberton had concluded, the plaintiff's disc injury which he observed in June,
l!Jli8 resulted from some cause unknown to him (Tr.
:Hu). However, he was quite clear that the alleged second accident did not cause the sciatic nerve symptoms
of \\'hich the plaintiff complained, as this problem preexisted by some four months the claimed second accident (Tr. 344-345).
(Tr. 337).

A jury could reasonably conclude, as the jury in
this case did, that such conflicting medical testimony
established a pre-existing back condition and that the
daimc<l second accident did not cause the back condition
complained of. See 2 A.L.R. 3d 290, 348-353 for a colketion of cases upholding jury verdicts against the
plaintiff in similar factual situations.

11. PL ..-\INTIFF'S FAILURE TO OBJECT TO
THE COURT'S INSTRUCTIONS PRE7

CLUDES PLAINTIFF FROni ASSIGNING
AS ERROR THE COURT'S FAILURE TO
GIVE A REQUESTED INSTRUCTION
Plaintiff urges as its second point on this appeal,
that the trial court ered in refusing to give an instruction to the jury that they should find the Release dated
March 22, 1968 invalid if they further found that the
plaintiff suffered an injury to his back or spine in the
accident of November 25, 1967.
Plaintiff's argument on this point overlooks one
important matter. At the conclusion of the court's charge
to the jury, the court allowed counsel to take whatever
exceptions or to make whatever objections they wished
to that charge, and while defendant's counsel objected
to certain of the instructions and other portions of the
charge, plmntiffs counsel took no exceptions and rnade
no ob;ection whatever, (Tr. 428-430).
Rule 51, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides
as follows:
[l)f the instructions are to be given in writing,
all objections thereto must be made before the instructions are given to the jury; otherwise, objections may be made to the instructions after
they are given to the jury, but before the jury
retires to consider its verdict. No party may assign as error the giving or the failure to give an
in8truction unless he ob;ects thereto. In objecting to the giving of an instruction, a party must
state distinctly the matter to which he objects
and the grounds for his objection. Notwithstanding the foregoing requirement, the appellate
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court, in its discretion and in the interests of justice, may review the giving or failure to give an
instruetion. Opportunity shall be given to make
objeetions, and they shall be made, out of the
hearing of the jury. [Emphasis added}.
The compiler's notes indicate, with respect to this
portion of Rule 51, that this court is authorized only in
··exceptional instances" to review alleged error assigned
by an appellant who failed to timely object to instructions of the lower court. Those notes further state that
"this provision is not to be construed as obviating the
neeessity of making objections at the time of trial to the
giving or failure to giYe any instruction" (Rule 51, p.
608, Ctah Code Annotated).
In iJ'lcCall v. Kendrick 2 U.2d 364, 274 P.2d 962
( 1954), this court held that the exercise of its discretionary authority under Rule 51 to review a trial court's
failure to give an instruction where no objection was
made below, was the exception and not the rule, and
would be itwoked only "to extricate a person from a situation where some gross injustice or inequity would
othenvise result." The court further ruled that the burden of showing such special circumstances rests upon
the party seeking to vary the rule.
The court has more recently said that it would re,·iew alleged error not objected to below "only under
unusual circumstances where the interests of justice
urgently so demand." JVilliams v. Lloyd, 16 U.2d 427,
4-03 P.2d 106 ( 196.5). See also, Weber Basin Water
Cons. Dist. v. Skeen, 8 U.2d 79, 328 P.2d 730 (1958)
9

and Beck v. Dutchman Coalition 1llincs Cu., 2 U.2d 104,
269 P.2d 867 ( 1954) for similar instances in which
court declined to review alleged instructional errors not
objected to at trial.
The primary purpose of requiring counsel to make
objections to instructions in the trial court is to bring to
the court's attention at that time all. claimed errors, and
to give the court an opportunity to correct them. llill ·c.
Cloward 14 U.2d 55, 377 P.2d 186 ( HW2) ; Emplo.!Jcrs
1llut. Liability Ins. Co. v. Allen Oil Co., 123 U.253, 258
P.2d 445, 450 ( 1953); and State v. Zim mennan 78
U.126, 130 P.2d 962 (1931).
The authority from other jurisdictions, which precludes appellate review when no objection was made
below to instructions, is so abundant as to be burdensome
of citation. :For a collection of cases from other jurisdicand
tions, see 5 Am. Jur. 2d Appeal and Error,
53 Am. J ur. Trial §827.
Plaintiff's assertion of error in the court's instructions also lacks merit for another reason. The instruction
which plaintiff now asserts the court erroneously refused to give was never proposed by plaintiff, and it has
long been established in Utah that error cannot be based
on a trial court's failure to give a particular instruction
when no request therefore has been ma<le. 1'a.1Jlor v. Los
Angeles and S.L.R. Co., 61 U.524, 216 P.239 ( 1922);
Salt Lake and U.R. Co. v. Schramm 5ti U.53, 189 P.90
(1920); In re Hanson's 1fTill, 50 U.207, 167 P.256
(1917); and State v. Yee Foo Lun, 45 U.531, 540, 147
P.488 (1915).

IO

The only instructions which plaintiff requested regarding the iegal effect of the Release were given by
the court (Tr. 56, 57-69) and plaintiff cannot be heard
to complain that the lower court "refused" to give some
further instructions on the matter, which even plaintiff
at the time apparently did not think was necessary. It is
elemental that claimed error in a trial court's failure to
submit an issue to the jury cannot be raised for the first
time on appeal. See 5 Am. J ur. 2d, Appeal and Error,
S618, and the cases there collected.
lll. PLAINTIFF'S FAILURE TO OBJECT TO
THE SUllnlISSION OF THE SPECIAL
INTERROGATORY TO THE JURY PRECLUDES PLAINTIFF FROM ASSIGNING
THAT SUBl\lISSION AS ERROR

A. Plaintiffs Failure to Timely Object Operates as a
JVaiver
The trial record discloses that both the court and
defendant's counsel were initially of the view that the
ease should be submitted to the jury on a general verdict, without special interrogatories relating to the Release (Tr. 422) . After hearing plaintiff's counsel on the
matter, however, the court indicated that it would submit a special interrogatory to the jury on "the validity
of the Release" (Tr. 424). The court then included
within its charge to the jury the special interrogatory regarding the Release of March 22, 1968 (Tr. 59). Just
as with the instructions, plaintiff's counsel made no ob-
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jection whatever to the speeial interrogatory, either in
substance or in form (Tr. 429-.J.30). Plaintiff's counsel
furthermore a<lmits that he cu11rnrrcd in the special interrogatory submitted to the jury regarding the rnlidity
of the Release (Tr. 166) .
Some years ago this court recognized that while
Rule 51, U.R.C.P. did not expressly refer to special interrogatories, it felt that the same principles reganling
timely objections thereto were "undoubtedly so11rnf'
applied to special interrogatories as "ell as instructions.
Cooper v. Evans, l U.2<l 68, 70, 262 P.2d 278 ( Hl.):J).
The plaintiff, having made no objection to the special interrogatory, cannot Le heard to complain for the
first time on appeal about the substance or form of that
interrogatory. In Baker v. Cook, 6 U.2d llil, 308 P.:Zcl
264 ( 1957), this court refused to reyiew such an untimely objection, and on this point stated:

[D]efendant neither u!Jjl'l'ted 11ur e,rccpted to
the form uf questions and coun.scl C([nnot sit back
and permit the court to submit the propositions
and object if the 1'rrdi<'f is unfm.'orahle. The court
had instructed the jury on the burden of proof
and preponderance of the evidence. After the
case was submitted the jury returned to ask the
court what would happen if
answered "yes"
to both questions I and 2. N" either before the
jury was charged, nor in the exceptions taken
after the jury left to deliberate, nor when the
jury came in for further
did defendant suggest that the propos1t10ns were confusing and should he <'larificd. X e1 cr until
proposition teas presented to this court was If
1
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urged that the prupositiuns were confusing. [Emphasis added}.

ln order to take advantage on review of an alleged
defect in a jury's verdict, the question must be raised
and reserved in the trial court, and failure to timely object below to such matters operates as a waiver of the
right to have such a matter considered on review. See 5
Am. J ur. 2d, Appeal and Error, §637 and the cases there
eullected.
Rule 49 ( b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
is identical in pertinent part to Utah's Rule 49 ( b) on
speeial interrogatories; and it is well established under
that rule that one who fails to object to the substance or
form of special interrogatories submitted to a jury cannot thereafter object on appeal. Safeway Stores, Inc. v.
Dial, 311 F.2d 595 (5th Cir. 1963) ; Penn v. Glenn, 265
F.2d 911 (6th Cir. 1959); Clegg v. Hardware Mut.
Cas. Co., 264 F.2d 152 (5th Cir. 1959); and Mitchell v.
Su:ift Co., 151 F.2d 770 (5th Cir. 1945).
An appellant cannot claim on appeal that a jury
was confused by a special interrogatory, where the appellant failed to object to the wording of the interrogatory or in any way indicated at the trial that he was dissatisfied with the court's charge to the jury. Frankel v.
Bur!.·e's Escavatinr;, Inc., 269 F. Supp. 1007 (D. Pa.
HW7) aff'd 397 F.2d 167 (3rd Cir. 1968); Halprin v.
Illura, 231 F.2d 197, 200 (3rd Cir. 1956); and Huse v.
Coruwlidated Freightwa.7JS, 227 F.2d 425 (7th Cir.
1955).
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B. Validity of the Release 1Vas lntroduccd as an Issue
by the Plaintiff

In plaintiff's proposed lnstrudions N o.'.s 1 and :Z,
plaintiff sought to have the jury find the He lease "of no
legal effect" (Tr. 68-69), and the rnurt gave those Instructions in substance (Inst. No. 31, Tr. 54). Thus, it
is clear that the plaintiff introduced into the court's
charge the very concept of which he now complains, i.e.,
the submission to the jury of a conclusion of law rather
than a finding of fact.
It is interesting to note that, while plaintiff complains that it was error to submit the question of validity
of the Release to the jury, plaintiff's Point II in its
Brief is that the court also erred in failing to instruct the
jury that, if they found the plaintiff suffered injury to
his back or spine in the first accident, they should then
find the Release invalid. Again, we see another demonstration of the plaintiff inYiting the Yery alleged error
now complained of on appeal.

Under the doctrinc of in \'ited error, a party cannot
successfully complain on appeal about error of the trial
court in submitting a particular question to the jurr
where its submission was done at the complaining party's
request or suggestion, Law v. United States, 26G U.S.
494, 45 S. Ct. 175 ( 1925) ; Gordon 11• Chicago, R.I.
P. Railroad Co., 154 Imva 449, 134 N.,V. 1057 ( 1925);
and see 5 Am. J ur. 2d Appeal and Error
for a
collection of recent cases following the principle announced in the Law decision.
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C. 'The Court's Charge, Considered as a Whole, Was

Entirely Proper

Rule J9 ( b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, expressly provides for a general verdict accompanied by
one or more special interrogatories. That Rule provides
in pertinent part that "[TJhe court shall give such explanation or instruction as may be necessary to enable
the jury both to make answers to the interrogatories and
to render a general verdict, and the court shall direct
the jury both to make written answers and to render a
general verdict."
Plaintiff contends on this appeal that Rule 49 ( b),
U.R.C.P., will not allow for the submission of an interrogatory calling for anything beyond a naked finding of fact. However, this argument seeks to too narrowly confine the scope of Rule 49 (b). That Rule is identical to Rule 49 ( b), Fed. Rules of Civ. Proc., and there
are numerous decisions under that federal rule which
hold that special interrogatories to a jury can be mixed
questions of law and fact, provided the jury is properly
instructed as to the legal standards which is to apply.
To this effect, see Kissell v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp.,
Elevator Division, 367 F.2d 375 (1st Cir. 1966); Scott
v. Isbrandtsen Co., 327 F.2d 113 (4th Cir. 1964); Great
Am. Ins. Co. v. Horab, 309 F.2d 262 (8th Cir. 1962);
JlcDonnell v. Timmerman, 269 F.2d 54 (8th Cir. 1959);
and Jackson v. King, 223 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1955).
It is obvious from a reading of the trial court's instructions that the jury was properly instructed in the
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instant case on the legal sta11dards it was to apply to the
Release involved. Instruction No. 31, proposed /Jy the
plaintiff, contemplated that if the jury found that the
plaintiff at the time he executed the Release did not
know the nature and extent of his injuries, it could then
find the Release "of no legal effect" (Tr. 54).
In its Instruction No.
the court instructed in
cff ect that the Release was presumed valid and could he
overcome only if the jury believed that the plaintiff, by
a fair preponderance of the evidence, had established
that the parties at the time the Release was executed
were acting "under a mutually mistaken belief as to the
true nature and extent of the injuries sustained by the
plaintiff" in the first accident (Tr. 55).
The court then instructed the jury, in connection
with the foregoing instructions regarding the legal
standards to be applied to the Release, that the court
was going to submit to the jury the special interrogatory
(Tr. 59). Finally, the jury was instructed in Ko. 41
that it was not to consider specific aspects of the charge
separately, but was to consider the charge in its entirety
(Tr. 65).
Taking all these instructions together, it is ckar
that the jury was properly called upon to make a factual
determination, before reaching an affirmative answer to
the special interrogatory on the validity of the Release,
that there had been no mutual mistake of fact at the time
the parties entered into that Release. In upholding the
Release, the jury demonstrated, ipso facto that it had
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fouu<l in the evidence no exculpatory mistake of fact.
The verdict of the jury was entirely consistent with the
eridence, and with the proper legal standard to be applied to the Release, as enunciated by the trial court in
its Instruction No. 32.
Plaintiff's argument that he was prejudiced by
errors in the mechanics of the court's charge was answered by this court in FI anks v. Christensen, 11 U.2d 8
(moo) wherein the court stated:
["']hat the party is entitled to is a presentation
of the case to the jury under instructions that
clearly, concisely and accurately state the issues
and the law applicable thereto so that the jury
will understand its duties. Unless the procedure
followed would militate against accomplishing
that purpose by causing proper instructions to
be omitted or improper ones to be given, there
would be no prejudicial error and the mechanics
of the procedure would not be of controlling importance.

CONCLUSION
The record of the trial of this matter contains ample
support for the jury's verdict for the defendant, no cause
of action. "Tith respect to the alleged accident of October 17, 1968, there is sufficient evidence in the record
to support the verdict on any one of three alternative
grounds, i.e., (I) that the alleged accident did not take
place; or ( 2) that the accident took place, but was
caused solely by the plaintiff's own negligence; or (3)
17

that plaintiff's back problems pre-existed the alleged
second accident and were not proximately caused thereby. Plaintiff in his Brief disregards all three of these
alternative grounds for the jury verdict. The errors
which plaintiff seeks to assign to the court's instructions
and special interrogatory tu the jury, were not timely
objected to below, and plaintiff has thus wai\·ed his right
to have those matters reviewed on this appeal. For these
reasons, and upon the authorities cited, it is submitted
that the jury verdict in this case was proper and well
founded and should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted
VAN COTT, BAGLEY,
CORN"T ALL & l\IcCAHTHY
CLIFFOHD L. ASHTON
RICHARD ,V. GIAUQUE
Attorneys for Defendant-Hespondenl
The Denver & Hio Grande 'Vestern
Railroad Company
Suite 300, 141 East First South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84lll
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